

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION**

<b>DANNY TEMPLETON,</b>	)	
<b>ID # 1917256,</b>	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
<b>vs.</b>	)	<b>No. 3:14-CV-1274-B-BH</b>
	)	
<b>UNNAMED LAWYER,</b>	)	
Defendant.	)	<b>Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge</b>

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION**

Pursuant to Special Order No. 3-251, this case has been automatically referred for judicial screening. Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the case should be **DISMISSED** as frivolous.

**I. BACKGROUND**

Danny Templeton (Plaintiff) sues his unnamed former defense attorney under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Complaint at 3).<sup>1</sup> He claims that when he declined to accept a plea deal in three pending felony cases on February 12, 2014, his appointed attorney called him “crazy, stupid, and retarded” multiple times. As a result, the trial court fired this attorney and replaced him with another. (Compl. at 6-7). This incident allegedly caused Plaintiff to go against his own better judgment and accept an open guilty plea. *Id.* No process has been issued in this case.

**II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING**

Because Plaintiff has been permitted to proceed *in forma pauperis*, his complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b). That statute provides for *sua sponte* dismissal of the

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<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff asserts that he attempted to obtain this attorney’s name through the trial court, but it was not provided to him. (Compl. at 7). Dallas County records reflect that four different attorneys were appointed to represent him in his criminal cases. (See [www.dallascounty.org](http://www.dallascounty.org), Cause No. F12-70535). The name of the attorney is unnecessary to the disposition of this case.

complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” *Id.* at 327. A claim that falls under the rule announced in *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), “is legally frivolous unless the conviction or sentence at issue has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question.” *Hamilton v. Lyons*, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1996). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); *accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to “raise the right to relief above the speculative level.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. Mere “labels and conclusions” nor “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” suffice to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. *Id.*

### **III. SECTION 1983**

Plaintiff brings this action under § 1983, which “provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” *Livadas v. Bradshaw*, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. *See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks*, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); *Cornish v. Corr.*

*Servs. Corp.*, 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff sues an attorney previously appointed to represent him in connection with a state criminal proceeding. (Compl. at 3). It is well-established that an appointed attorney does not act under color of state law in representing a defendant at trial or on direct appeal. *See Polk County v. Dodson*, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (holding that “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding); *Mills v. Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 3*, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that “private attorneys, even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors, and generally are not subject to suit under section 1983”). Although a private party may be acting “under color of state law” and be held liable under § 1983 in certain circumstances, *see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.*, 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); *Wong v. Stripling*, 881 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff has made no allegation that his attorney was a state actor; he only complains about his actions in his criminal cases. Plaintiff has failed to state a viable § 1983 claim against his attorney, and his complaint should be dismissed.

#### IV. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff’s complaint should be **DISMISSED** with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This dismissal will count as a “strike” or “prior occasion” within the meaning 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Section 1915(g), which is commonly known as the “three-strikes” provision, provides:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section, if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

**SO RECOMMENDED this 19th day of May, 2014.**



IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND  
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT**

A copy of these findings, conclusions and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Servs. Automobile Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).



IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE